I've done very well this semester, but none of my grades are determined until I make it through finals, this Saturday through next Tuesday.
My first final is on Saturday, and it is in differential equations, the last dedicated math course on the standard chemical or biological engineering curriculum.Of course, being in an engineering major means this won't by any means be the last I see of math. But I have had class time dedicated specifically to math in all the time I've been in school since I started kindergarten, and it will be strange to leave that behind.
I've decided to add a minor in philosophy to my planned coursework at college. I have always been interested in the field, and I've enjoyed my Ethics class this semester immensely. I'm signed up for two more philosophy courses next semester, and I'm very much looking forward to them.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Monday, November 23, 2009
Mission statement (work in progress), take 2
To remain actively engaged in life.
To look at the world with wonder, and embrace my natural desire to understand it more fully.
To embrace the full spectrum of my emotions, rather than running from the ones that make me uncomfortable.
To take full responsibility for my choices.
To try my best to understand others, fully realizing that everyone has hopes, fears, desires, and the other things which drive me.
To seek out kindred spirits, and to intensify life with and through mutual respect and understanding.
To maintain a true and independent identity by being true to myself above and before all else.
To look at the world with wonder, and embrace my natural desire to understand it more fully.
To embrace the full spectrum of my emotions, rather than running from the ones that make me uncomfortable.
To take full responsibility for my choices.
To try my best to understand others, fully realizing that everyone has hopes, fears, desires, and the other things which drive me.
To seek out kindred spirits, and to intensify life with and through mutual respect and understanding.
To maintain a true and independent identity by being true to myself above and before all else.
Friday, November 20, 2009
Ethics Essay #2: Sartre's Existentialism and Its Flaws
(Note: All quotes come from "Jean-Paul Sartre: Basic Writings", edited by Stephen Priest, which contains selections from several of Sartre's works.)
One of the most famous existentialist philosophers, Jean-Paul Sartre, gave a lecture in 1945 entitled Existentialism and Humanism. In it, he attempted to distill the broad concepts of his philosophy into a form which is accessible to those without years of experience in philosophy. He summed up the central notion of his philosophy, saying (p. 32), “We are left alone, without excuse. This is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.” This notion of radical freedom and responsibility, without excuse, is a vital component of Sartre's philosophy. It is not, however, obviously true. There are reasonable objections to this view which seem to do serious damage to his philosophy. I will argue that, while Sartre's arguments can overcome the most obvious objection, there is another, less obvious, objection which seems more damaging to Sartre's views, and indeed leads to the realization of what may be a fundamental flaw in his reasoning.
Sartre's particular brand of existentialism takes as its starting point the notion that God does not exist; though, Sartre says (p. 46), “even if God existed that would make no difference,” since each of us would have to decide for ourselves what God is like, what he wants, and how he views mankind. If there is no definite creator, there cannot be said to be a definite concept of man that is present before man exists. In other words (p. 28), “man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. … [T]o begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it.” In philosophical terms, man's existence (which comes about simply as a result of his birth) precedes his essence (his identity, or what we refer to as “who he is”).
Most older philosophers, including many of the most famous (Aristotle, Kant, and Mill, for instance) based their philosophies on some “universal good” which they took as their starting point. This process, though, fundamentally relies on there being an external source of value which dictates what the universal good is. Originally, the source was God; but even when some philosophers began to toy with atheism, Sartre says (p. 31) their reasoning was that “if we are to have morality, a society and a law-abiding world, it is essential that certain values should be taken seriously; they must have an a priori existence ascribed to them.” These philosophers tried to do away with the concept of God, while keeping intact the values derived originally from the existence of God. Sartre, on the other hand, believes “[t]here can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that “the good” exists.” This is what existentialists refer to as 'abandonment'. Sartre views his philosophy as a much more sensible view for atheists, and for those who realize at least that God is subjective.
If human existence precedes essence, this leads directly to Sartre's view of radical freedom and responsibility. If I create my essence, then I am wholly responsible for who I am. Furthermore, Sartre says (p. 29), “To choose between this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen; for we are unable ever to choose the worse. What we choose is always better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all.” In other words, through my choices, I am creating myself, as well as an image of what man ought to be. Sartre says (p. 30) that when we realize this, we “cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility,” which existentialists refer to as 'anguish'.
Another key point of Sartre's philosophy is that, as he says (p. 36), “Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in so far as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is.” This is a response to a common theme of human thought which Sartre views as self-deception; that is, the view on my deathbed that I could have been something other than what I am, and that these possibilities are a part of my essence, or identity. I might say, for instance, that I would have been a best-selling author if only I could have found the right theme to base a book on. Sartre says (p. 37), “for the existentialist, there is no love apart from the deeds of love; no potentiality of love other than that which is manifested in loving; there is no genius other than that which is expressed in works of art.” Furthermore, we attempt to define ourselves by our could-have-beens in an inherently flawed way; that is, if a goal works out we look to the results as an indication of our essence, but if it doesn't work out we define ourselves based on what the results could have been. Sartre, however, claims that our actions alone indicate who we are, what we care about, and what our feelings are, because “reality alone is reliable.”
One objection that can be raised to Sartre's view on responsibility has to do with his claim that there is no such thing as human nature. As mentioned earlier, this claim is one of the implications of the general idea that human existence precedes essence. It seems, however, to be a rather odd claim. After all, people speak of human nature all the time; and we base our ideas of human nature on the solid grounding of history. That is, those things which we often excuse people for on the grounds that they are “just human nature” – greed and jealousy, for example – are things which history has shown, time and time again, tend to simply be a part of being human. It does not seem unreasonable to say “everyone is sometimes greedy.” Therefore, human nature exists. If human nature exists, there is something fundamentally wrong with existentialism's basic idea of existence preceding essence. Furthermore, it seems as though we can excuse ourselves from some of the responsibility for our actions, which directly contradicts Sartre's responsibility quote.
In response to this, Sartre would likely argue that 'greed', 'jealousy', and other such words, in the sense that we think about them as being human nature, are not really states of being. Rather, they are feelings, desires, impulses, to which we falsely appeal as reasons for our actions. In Existentialism and Humanism, discussing the case of the young man trying to decide whether to fight the Nazis or stay home with his mother, Sartre says (p. 34) that the answer the young man came up with on his own was to appeal to the strength of his feelings. However, according to Sartre, “I may say, 'I love my mother enough to remain with her,' [only] if actually I have remained with her.” Thus, to rely on feelings as a basis for justifying my actions is to find myself “drawn into a vicious circle.” I can only say I am greedy if my actions have shown me to be so; I cannot, conversely, justify a greedy action on the grounds that I am by nature greedy, because I am only being greedy as soon as I have committed to the action. The effect of this is that these things which we call “human nature” are things which each of us chooses to be or not to be, simply through the way we act. You and I may have similar impulses, or passions. They may be similar enough to refer to them by the same words. They may even seem to be quite general to the human race. But, as Sartre says of our impulses in Being and Nothingness (p. 185), “their nature and their weight depend each moment on the meaning which I give to them.” The impulse to be greedy which I occasionally have is temporary, transient, and intangible, and thus cannot be said to be in my nature. It only becomes my essence if I allow it to take control of my actions, and that is a conscious choice which I am responsible for. Even if everyone else in the world chooses to act in a greedy manner, there is nothing which says I must do so as well, regardless of how strong the impulse is. There is thus no such thing as “human nature”.
The less obvious objection to Sartre's position can be seen by considering the case of mental illnesses, or developmental disabilities. There are a number of diseases, of both body and mind, which we do not choose, and which in turn hinder our ability to choose in other circumstances. If I truly believe I am hearing other-worldly voices in my head, it does not seem like I can reasonably be held responsible for this fact, if I have been diagnosed with something like schizophrenia. If my illness, furthermore, causes me to trust what the voices say, does this not also excuse me from at least some of the responsibility for the things I do in accordance with the voices' commands? If I have a developmental disorder which lowers my capacity for reason, does this not also lower my level of responsibility? These illnesses, in other words, seem to fundamentally and unalterably affect the essence of those who have them, by changing the way they act. As these illnesses are not chosen, this means there are factors outside of our own process of self-creation which create us. Modern science even goes so far as to say that genetic and environmental factors almost entirely form who we are. This is clearly contrary to Sartre's entire philosophy.
Sartre attempts a direct response to this problem in its schizophrenia form in Existentialism and Humanism, saying (p. 30), “[I]f I hear voices, who can prove that they proceed from heaven and not from hell, or from my own subconsciousness or some pathological condition? . . . If a voice speaks to me, it is still I myself who must decide whether the voice is or is not that of an angel.” In other words, even the schizophrenic makes a free choice whether or not to trust that what the voices are telling him to do is right. This view, however, seems to contradict good science on the subject, meaning either the entire psychiatric community (whose conclusions rest on numerous observations of schizophrenic behavior) is wrong, or Sartre is wrong.
In a broader sense, Sartre's philosophy (p. 178-9) sees illnesses, genetic and environmental factors, and the like as parts of the 'situation' each of us is in. These situational factors can limit our capabilities, but we still have radical freedom – and thus responsibility – because we always have choices to make, even when we are restricted. However, this seems to be an inadequate defense of his position. If, as Sartre would probably accept, a severely mentally handicapped person cannot choose not to be otherwise, he cannot be said to be responsible for his condition. If, furthermore, the symptoms of his illness include a decreased capacity for reason, how can Sartre or anyone else hold him completely responsible for his actions? He certainly makes choices, and acts; but Sartre's view of radical freedom and responsibility rests on man being a rational being, capable of freely forming his essence. On another note, what could Sartre possibly have to say about the freedom or responsibility of a person in a conscious but vegetative state, capable of thought but not action? It seems as though Sartre assumes every one of us is capable of action, and the rational thought necessary to take responsibility for our actions; but this is an impossible claim to make if there is no predetermined human essence. This, perhaps, is the root of the problem.
Sartre's philosophy, and existentialism in general, is certainly an interesting way to look at the world. In most cases, it seems as though it might even be correct. The notion of radical freedom and responsibility, for instance, seems quite reasonable in most cases, and would tend to make us consider our actions much more carefully – which is obviously a good thing. However, there is clearly something missing from any philosophy which is so thoroughly dismissive of the effects many situational factors can have on us. In short, it seems Sartre's existentialism could use some fundamental changes.
One of the most famous existentialist philosophers, Jean-Paul Sartre, gave a lecture in 1945 entitled Existentialism and Humanism. In it, he attempted to distill the broad concepts of his philosophy into a form which is accessible to those without years of experience in philosophy. He summed up the central notion of his philosophy, saying (p. 32), “We are left alone, without excuse. This is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free.” This notion of radical freedom and responsibility, without excuse, is a vital component of Sartre's philosophy. It is not, however, obviously true. There are reasonable objections to this view which seem to do serious damage to his philosophy. I will argue that, while Sartre's arguments can overcome the most obvious objection, there is another, less obvious, objection which seems more damaging to Sartre's views, and indeed leads to the realization of what may be a fundamental flaw in his reasoning.
Sartre's particular brand of existentialism takes as its starting point the notion that God does not exist; though, Sartre says (p. 46), “even if God existed that would make no difference,” since each of us would have to decide for ourselves what God is like, what he wants, and how he views mankind. If there is no definite creator, there cannot be said to be a definite concept of man that is present before man exists. In other words (p. 28), “man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards. … [T]o begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it.” In philosophical terms, man's existence (which comes about simply as a result of his birth) precedes his essence (his identity, or what we refer to as “who he is”).
Most older philosophers, including many of the most famous (Aristotle, Kant, and Mill, for instance) based their philosophies on some “universal good” which they took as their starting point. This process, though, fundamentally relies on there being an external source of value which dictates what the universal good is. Originally, the source was God; but even when some philosophers began to toy with atheism, Sartre says (p. 31) their reasoning was that “if we are to have morality, a society and a law-abiding world, it is essential that certain values should be taken seriously; they must have an a priori existence ascribed to them.” These philosophers tried to do away with the concept of God, while keeping intact the values derived originally from the existence of God. Sartre, on the other hand, believes “[t]here can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it. It is nowhere written that “the good” exists.” This is what existentialists refer to as 'abandonment'. Sartre views his philosophy as a much more sensible view for atheists, and for those who realize at least that God is subjective.
If human existence precedes essence, this leads directly to Sartre's view of radical freedom and responsibility. If I create my essence, then I am wholly responsible for who I am. Furthermore, Sartre says (p. 29), “To choose between this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen; for we are unable ever to choose the worse. What we choose is always better; and nothing can be better for us unless it is better for all.” In other words, through my choices, I am creating myself, as well as an image of what man ought to be. Sartre says (p. 30) that when we realize this, we “cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility,” which existentialists refer to as 'anguish'.
Another key point of Sartre's philosophy is that, as he says (p. 36), “Man is nothing else but what he purposes, he exists only in so far as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is.” This is a response to a common theme of human thought which Sartre views as self-deception; that is, the view on my deathbed that I could have been something other than what I am, and that these possibilities are a part of my essence, or identity. I might say, for instance, that I would have been a best-selling author if only I could have found the right theme to base a book on. Sartre says (p. 37), “for the existentialist, there is no love apart from the deeds of love; no potentiality of love other than that which is manifested in loving; there is no genius other than that which is expressed in works of art.” Furthermore, we attempt to define ourselves by our could-have-beens in an inherently flawed way; that is, if a goal works out we look to the results as an indication of our essence, but if it doesn't work out we define ourselves based on what the results could have been. Sartre, however, claims that our actions alone indicate who we are, what we care about, and what our feelings are, because “reality alone is reliable.”
One objection that can be raised to Sartre's view on responsibility has to do with his claim that there is no such thing as human nature. As mentioned earlier, this claim is one of the implications of the general idea that human existence precedes essence. It seems, however, to be a rather odd claim. After all, people speak of human nature all the time; and we base our ideas of human nature on the solid grounding of history. That is, those things which we often excuse people for on the grounds that they are “just human nature” – greed and jealousy, for example – are things which history has shown, time and time again, tend to simply be a part of being human. It does not seem unreasonable to say “everyone is sometimes greedy.” Therefore, human nature exists. If human nature exists, there is something fundamentally wrong with existentialism's basic idea of existence preceding essence. Furthermore, it seems as though we can excuse ourselves from some of the responsibility for our actions, which directly contradicts Sartre's responsibility quote.
In response to this, Sartre would likely argue that 'greed', 'jealousy', and other such words, in the sense that we think about them as being human nature, are not really states of being. Rather, they are feelings, desires, impulses, to which we falsely appeal as reasons for our actions. In Existentialism and Humanism, discussing the case of the young man trying to decide whether to fight the Nazis or stay home with his mother, Sartre says (p. 34) that the answer the young man came up with on his own was to appeal to the strength of his feelings. However, according to Sartre, “I may say, 'I love my mother enough to remain with her,' [only] if actually I have remained with her.” Thus, to rely on feelings as a basis for justifying my actions is to find myself “drawn into a vicious circle.” I can only say I am greedy if my actions have shown me to be so; I cannot, conversely, justify a greedy action on the grounds that I am by nature greedy, because I am only being greedy as soon as I have committed to the action. The effect of this is that these things which we call “human nature” are things which each of us chooses to be or not to be, simply through the way we act. You and I may have similar impulses, or passions. They may be similar enough to refer to them by the same words. They may even seem to be quite general to the human race. But, as Sartre says of our impulses in Being and Nothingness (p. 185), “their nature and their weight depend each moment on the meaning which I give to them.” The impulse to be greedy which I occasionally have is temporary, transient, and intangible, and thus cannot be said to be in my nature. It only becomes my essence if I allow it to take control of my actions, and that is a conscious choice which I am responsible for. Even if everyone else in the world chooses to act in a greedy manner, there is nothing which says I must do so as well, regardless of how strong the impulse is. There is thus no such thing as “human nature”.
The less obvious objection to Sartre's position can be seen by considering the case of mental illnesses, or developmental disabilities. There are a number of diseases, of both body and mind, which we do not choose, and which in turn hinder our ability to choose in other circumstances. If I truly believe I am hearing other-worldly voices in my head, it does not seem like I can reasonably be held responsible for this fact, if I have been diagnosed with something like schizophrenia. If my illness, furthermore, causes me to trust what the voices say, does this not also excuse me from at least some of the responsibility for the things I do in accordance with the voices' commands? If I have a developmental disorder which lowers my capacity for reason, does this not also lower my level of responsibility? These illnesses, in other words, seem to fundamentally and unalterably affect the essence of those who have them, by changing the way they act. As these illnesses are not chosen, this means there are factors outside of our own process of self-creation which create us. Modern science even goes so far as to say that genetic and environmental factors almost entirely form who we are. This is clearly contrary to Sartre's entire philosophy.
Sartre attempts a direct response to this problem in its schizophrenia form in Existentialism and Humanism, saying (p. 30), “[I]f I hear voices, who can prove that they proceed from heaven and not from hell, or from my own subconsciousness or some pathological condition? . . . If a voice speaks to me, it is still I myself who must decide whether the voice is or is not that of an angel.” In other words, even the schizophrenic makes a free choice whether or not to trust that what the voices are telling him to do is right. This view, however, seems to contradict good science on the subject, meaning either the entire psychiatric community (whose conclusions rest on numerous observations of schizophrenic behavior) is wrong, or Sartre is wrong.
In a broader sense, Sartre's philosophy (p. 178-9) sees illnesses, genetic and environmental factors, and the like as parts of the 'situation' each of us is in. These situational factors can limit our capabilities, but we still have radical freedom – and thus responsibility – because we always have choices to make, even when we are restricted. However, this seems to be an inadequate defense of his position. If, as Sartre would probably accept, a severely mentally handicapped person cannot choose not to be otherwise, he cannot be said to be responsible for his condition. If, furthermore, the symptoms of his illness include a decreased capacity for reason, how can Sartre or anyone else hold him completely responsible for his actions? He certainly makes choices, and acts; but Sartre's view of radical freedom and responsibility rests on man being a rational being, capable of freely forming his essence. On another note, what could Sartre possibly have to say about the freedom or responsibility of a person in a conscious but vegetative state, capable of thought but not action? It seems as though Sartre assumes every one of us is capable of action, and the rational thought necessary to take responsibility for our actions; but this is an impossible claim to make if there is no predetermined human essence. This, perhaps, is the root of the problem.
Sartre's philosophy, and existentialism in general, is certainly an interesting way to look at the world. In most cases, it seems as though it might even be correct. The notion of radical freedom and responsibility, for instance, seems quite reasonable in most cases, and would tend to make us consider our actions much more carefully – which is obviously a good thing. However, there is clearly something missing from any philosophy which is so thoroughly dismissive of the effects many situational factors can have on us. In short, it seems Sartre's existentialism could use some fundamental changes.
Monday, November 16, 2009
The free market
The other day, I was paying for groceries with my debit card at one of the self-checkout lanes of a grocery store. It occurred to me that the entire process is incredibly bizarre.
After all, I walked into the store with nothing of value, left nothing of value behind, and left with enough food for a week. I did this without dealing with a single representative of the store or its interests. And this was perfectly legal.
Paper money works essentially the same way; but at least when cash changes hands, this is an exchange of a physical good which has a definite worth determined by the market. The only thing you have to have faith in when accepting cash is that it will be worth what you think it's worth when you decide to spend it.
With debit cards and the like, there is a virtual, rather than physical, exchange of money; so there are two layers of good faith involved in the exchange: faith in cash, and faith in the digital systems' ability to properly represent cash flow in a virtual environment.
Does it really make sense to rely on these two factors? With the state of the economy, the public debt, and the projected budget deficits for the next several years, it seems as though our nation's financial course is unsustainable. It's not difficult to imagine the total financial collapse of the Federal government, which would result (among other things) in a massive devaluation of American cash. Computer systems, furthermore, are accessible to all the immoral computer geeks of the world.
In short, on a daily basis, we place an enormous amount of faith on these two factors which seem fundamentally unworthy of our faith. Is this a sensible system; and, more to the point, is it a sustainable system?
After all, I walked into the store with nothing of value, left nothing of value behind, and left with enough food for a week. I did this without dealing with a single representative of the store or its interests. And this was perfectly legal.
Paper money works essentially the same way; but at least when cash changes hands, this is an exchange of a physical good which has a definite worth determined by the market. The only thing you have to have faith in when accepting cash is that it will be worth what you think it's worth when you decide to spend it.
With debit cards and the like, there is a virtual, rather than physical, exchange of money; so there are two layers of good faith involved in the exchange: faith in cash, and faith in the digital systems' ability to properly represent cash flow in a virtual environment.
Does it really make sense to rely on these two factors? With the state of the economy, the public debt, and the projected budget deficits for the next several years, it seems as though our nation's financial course is unsustainable. It's not difficult to imagine the total financial collapse of the Federal government, which would result (among other things) in a massive devaluation of American cash. Computer systems, furthermore, are accessible to all the immoral computer geeks of the world.
In short, on a daily basis, we place an enormous amount of faith on these two factors which seem fundamentally unworthy of our faith. Is this a sensible system; and, more to the point, is it a sustainable system?
Friday, November 6, 2009
Separate but equal?
The fight over same-sex marriage in America rages on.
With the vote in Maine three days ago, gay marriage has now been forbidden by the people in 31 states - every state in which the issue has come to a popular vote. In other words, no American electoral majority has ever supported gay marriage.
Many liberals would be quick to point out that it's important to keep this in perspective, remembering all the progress that has been made, and keeping in mind that the demographic momentum is in favor of same-sex marriage, since young people mostly think gays should be allowed to marry. Others would point to the vote on the same day in which Washington was added to the list of states whose voters have approved "everything but marriage" - civil unions with all or nearly all of the protections afforded by marriage - as a heartening sign.
Many would even go so far as to say that the fact that civil unions appear to be a more attainable goal makes them a more worthy goal. The pragmatist in me understands this line of thought. The pursuit of marriage equality in America is, even today, an incredibly daunting task. Large percentages of the electorate still view homosexuality as not just immoral but sinful; so they naturally believe that it is their duty as Americans to stop any attempts to normalize it, and that by doing so they are saving America from damnation.
These people are willing to do incredible mental gymnastics to find justifications for their opposition to same-sex marriage that appear logical to the average person. But it's much harder to logically justify opposition to civil unions, since they can't be seen to involve a redefinition of traditional marriage. The effect of this fact is that, in places where a slim majority opposes same sex marriage, a slim majority also supports civil unions. And of course, equality of legal recognition for gay couples seems far more important than the terminology; so it seems reasonable to forget about marriage (at least for a while), and focus on getting civil unions.
But let's think, for a moment, of the implications of legalizing civil unions, rather than marriage, for same-sex couples.
The logic of civil unions rests on the precept that homosexual relationships should only be legally recognized by setting up a separate system, for them to use, where normal people would get married. Civil unions, therefore, accept that a homosexual relationship is fundamentally different from what is normal and acceptable in polite society - and that, to reflect this, we must use a different set of legal protections for their relationships. All this, while proclaiming that we are affirming their equal rights.
But how can we possibly affirm equal rights through separate legal protections? Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution says, in part, "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." For a long time, racial segregation in America was justified by saying that as long as the public services afforded to non-whites were equal, it was alright if they were separate, if society demanded so. In the 1954 supreme court case Brown v. Board of Education, the court unanimously ruled that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Cannot the same be said of separate legal codes to recognize relationships?
This is why I am a supporter of gay marriage, rather than the more pragmatic civil unions. Granted, I generally think there are far more pressing issues facing America, and the world, than the question of who can marry who - that's why this is the first blog post I've written dedicated to the topic - but that doesn't make the current situation regarding marriage in America any less unjust. It is my sincere hope that the American electorate can manage to get its head out of its ass and realize the clear and unequivocal truth - that gays have, and have always had, the right to marry; and must in turn be given the legal ability to do so.
With the vote in Maine three days ago, gay marriage has now been forbidden by the people in 31 states - every state in which the issue has come to a popular vote. In other words, no American electoral majority has ever supported gay marriage.
Many liberals would be quick to point out that it's important to keep this in perspective, remembering all the progress that has been made, and keeping in mind that the demographic momentum is in favor of same-sex marriage, since young people mostly think gays should be allowed to marry. Others would point to the vote on the same day in which Washington was added to the list of states whose voters have approved "everything but marriage" - civil unions with all or nearly all of the protections afforded by marriage - as a heartening sign.
Many would even go so far as to say that the fact that civil unions appear to be a more attainable goal makes them a more worthy goal. The pragmatist in me understands this line of thought. The pursuit of marriage equality in America is, even today, an incredibly daunting task. Large percentages of the electorate still view homosexuality as not just immoral but sinful; so they naturally believe that it is their duty as Americans to stop any attempts to normalize it, and that by doing so they are saving America from damnation.
These people are willing to do incredible mental gymnastics to find justifications for their opposition to same-sex marriage that appear logical to the average person. But it's much harder to logically justify opposition to civil unions, since they can't be seen to involve a redefinition of traditional marriage. The effect of this fact is that, in places where a slim majority opposes same sex marriage, a slim majority also supports civil unions. And of course, equality of legal recognition for gay couples seems far more important than the terminology; so it seems reasonable to forget about marriage (at least for a while), and focus on getting civil unions.
But let's think, for a moment, of the implications of legalizing civil unions, rather than marriage, for same-sex couples.
The logic of civil unions rests on the precept that homosexual relationships should only be legally recognized by setting up a separate system, for them to use, where normal people would get married. Civil unions, therefore, accept that a homosexual relationship is fundamentally different from what is normal and acceptable in polite society - and that, to reflect this, we must use a different set of legal protections for their relationships. All this, while proclaiming that we are affirming their equal rights.
But how can we possibly affirm equal rights through separate legal protections? Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution says, in part, "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." For a long time, racial segregation in America was justified by saying that as long as the public services afforded to non-whites were equal, it was alright if they were separate, if society demanded so. In the 1954 supreme court case Brown v. Board of Education, the court unanimously ruled that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Cannot the same be said of separate legal codes to recognize relationships?
This is why I am a supporter of gay marriage, rather than the more pragmatic civil unions. Granted, I generally think there are far more pressing issues facing America, and the world, than the question of who can marry who - that's why this is the first blog post I've written dedicated to the topic - but that doesn't make the current situation regarding marriage in America any less unjust. It is my sincere hope that the American electorate can manage to get its head out of its ass and realize the clear and unequivocal truth - that gays have, and have always had, the right to marry; and must in turn be given the legal ability to do so.
Tuesday, November 3, 2009
Mission statement (work in progress)
To live.
To look at the world with wonder, and embrace my natural desire to understand it more fully.
To remain at all times open to the fluctuations of my mood; to accept all emotions that come to me as parts of the same unified whole.
To seek out kindred spirits, and to intensify life with and through mutual respect and understanding.
To maintain a true and independent identity by being true to myself above and before all else.
To look at the world with wonder, and embrace my natural desire to understand it more fully.
To remain at all times open to the fluctuations of my mood; to accept all emotions that come to me as parts of the same unified whole.
To seek out kindred spirits, and to intensify life with and through mutual respect and understanding.
To maintain a true and independent identity by being true to myself above and before all else.
Monday, November 2, 2009
cathartic release
forever and a day
by zach freier
you walked with me
that night through the
empty city streets
under a sky blackened
by clouds.
neither of us knew
the way, but i didn't
care, because
as long as we were
together, i was where
i needed to be.
but every time i
looked at you, you
seemed fainter, your eyes
dimmer, your face
more transparent, and
i knew you were leaving.
i asked if you remembered
all the times you said
you'd always be
there for me,
forever and a day.
you turned to look
into my eyes one last
time, and told me that
i didn't need you,
that even if i
don't know my way,
i'll always walk
in the right direction.
i closed my eyes as
you said you'd always
love me, and when i opened
them, you were gone.
i am lost without you.
by zach freier
you walked with me
that night through the
empty city streets
under a sky blackened
by clouds.
neither of us knew
the way, but i didn't
care, because
as long as we were
together, i was where
i needed to be.
but every time i
looked at you, you
seemed fainter, your eyes
dimmer, your face
more transparent, and
i knew you were leaving.
i asked if you remembered
all the times you said
you'd always be
there for me,
forever and a day.
you turned to look
into my eyes one last
time, and told me that
i didn't need you,
that even if i
don't know my way,
i'll always walk
in the right direction.
i closed my eyes as
you said you'd always
love me, and when i opened
them, you were gone.
i am lost without you.
Friday, September 18, 2009
Ethics Essay: Virtue and Self-Interest in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is one of the earliest philosophical works that is still taken seriously to this day. It is over two thousand years old, yet it is still considered by most to be one of the best and most vital philosophical works of all time. There are certainly some elements within it which most people today would find ridiculous – for example, the implication that women are inferior to men – but it is, for the most part, fundamentally sound. However, one of the vital pieces of Aristotle's whole system of ethics seems, at first glance, to be flawed. That is, Aristotle claims that virtue is an essential component to happiness, but certain virtuous acts seem to be entirely contrary to one's own self-interest and happiness. I will argue, however, that Aristotle is right in this regard – in other words, that being virtuous is in my own self-interest. I will start by providing an overview of the main themes of Nicomachean Ethics, with an emphasis on the connection between virtue and happiness, and then move on to more clearly stating the apparent problem in Aristotle's reasoning, and refuting that objection.
The central argument of Nicomachean Ethics is that the greatest good is happiness, and that each person should therefore pursue happiness as the central goal of their life. Aristotle comes to this conclusion, as well as a broad outline of what happiness is, in the introductory book (Book I). He claims that the greatest good must be the final end toward which everything else strives, and that it must be “always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else” and must on its own “make life desirable and lacking in nothing” (Book I, Ch. 7). Happiness, Aristotle says, meets these requirements, because “we choose [it] always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves . . . [are chosen] also for the sake of happiness.” Happiness is thus the greatest good, the pinnacle of excellence toward which we should all direct our lives and actions.
Aristotle's notion of happiness is, however, considerably different from the modern definition. Indeed, eudaimonia, the Greek word which Aristotle uses that has been translated as 'happiness', seems really to carry a connotation which the word 'happiness' does not. That is, eudaimonia is not a feeling, but a state of being; something which does not change from moment to moment, but rather can be used to describe a person's entire life. Eudaimonia, according to Aristotle, is a broad concept, which encompasses all of the lesser good pursuits of life – including pleasure, honor, friendship, even material wealth – but above all else, virtue.
This idea of virtue being the most vital component of happiness stems from what is known as Aristotle's function argument (Book I, Ch. 7). Aristotle claims that what makes something good can be found by asking what that something is good for; that is, what its function is. For example, the function of an eye is to see, so a good eye is one which sees well, and what is good for an eye is that which helps it to see well, such as glasses. The function of man, Aristotle says, is that capacity which man does not share with anything else. It cannot, therefore, be life, for this “seems to be common even to plants”; or sensory perception, for this “seems to be common even to . . . every animal.” This leaves us, according to Aristotle, with reason, as that which is unique to man. Thus, the function of man is reason; and a good man is one who lives a life full of activities that are in accordance with reason, which Aristotle equates with virtue; so a virtuous man is a good man. Furthermore, being a good person is a central component to leading a good, or happy, life, by Aristotle's definition.
Throughout Book II, Aristotle goes on to describe in detail what virtue is. He starts (Book II, Ch. 1) by splitting virtue into two classes, intellectual virtue and moral virtue. He says that while intellectual virtue can be taught, moral virtue – the more important type in regard to happiness, as it is the type which is concerned with actions and day-to-day life – “comes about as a result of habit.” That is, living virtuously makes one a virtuous person, which then leads to more virtuous actions.
Aristotle moves on to show the difference between virtue and the arts, through which he draws a vital conclusion about virtue (Book II, Ch. 4). He says “the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves”; that is, art can be judged as good or bad simply by looking at it. On the contrary, according to Aristotle, virtue depends not only on the action, but also on the mental state of the one performing the action. “The agent . . . must have knowledge”; that is, he must know that he is doing something virtuous; “he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes”; that is, he must choose to do it because it is virtuous; and “his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character”; that is, it is not true virtue if he happens to do something good, but rather doing good things must be part of his character. Aristotle also makes the claim that a virtuous person takes pleasure in doing virtuous things (Book II, Ch. 3).
The most important component of Aristotle's definition of virtue, though, is known as the doctrine of the mean (Book II, Ch. 6-9). The basic concept here is that “virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate” (Book II, Ch. 6); that is, for all passions and actions – such as fear, pleasure, anger, and honor – there can be too much, too little, or just the right amount. For example, it is possible to have too much fear – that is, to be cowardly; but it is also possible to have too little fear – that is, to be reckless. The middle ground here is a healthy, intermediate degree of courage, such that one does not run away from fearsome things, but also does not pursue them. Aristotle goes on to say (Book II, Ch. 8-9) that, while both the excess and the deficiency are inferior to the mean, in most cases one of them is closer to it. For instance, Aristotle says that recklessness is closer to courage than cowardice is.
Ultimately, much of the question of what is virtuous or not virtuous in any given situation is left to the reader to decide; after all, it would be impossible for Aristotle to look at every possible set of circumstances and actions and decide what the virtuous course of action is. Thus, Aristotle leaves us with these basic principles, and tells us to pursue happiness as our primary self-interest, and to do so primarily through performing virtuous acts.
The most profound and reasonable objection that can be raised against the position that it is in my own self-interest to be virtuous , by Aristotle's definition, is that it requires a lot of self-sacrifice. For instance, in his discussion of self-love (Book IX, Ch. 8), Aristotle claims that a good man “does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them.” For me to sacrifice my life for the sake of someone else would be the ultimate sacrifice; and this seems at odds with my own self-interest, as well as self-love, which Aristotle is promoting when he makes this claim. If I were to do such a thing, I would certainly be seen as noble by most people; but what good does that do me if I'm dead? A selfish person would most likely not be willing to give their life for someone else, precisely because they would see such an act as being in conflict with their self-interest. This conflict, furthermore, is not limited to the sacrifice of life. Indeed, Aristotle goes on to say that a good man will also sacrifice wealth, honor and office to his friends; but someone acting with their own self-interest in mind would not likely do these things, either. This seems, at first glance, to be a fatal flaw in Aristotle's reasoning.
Upon closer examination, however, there are several clear and powerful responses to this objection which, taken together, thoroughly refute it. The first comes from Aristotle's concept of true friendship, as discussed throughout Books VIII and IX. This is relevant because, when Aristotle said sacrifice is often a necessary component of virtue, he was talking about sacrificing for the sake of a friend (or one's country, and by extension all of one's friends). In a true friendship, according to Aristotle, both parties want what is good for each other. Indeed, Aristotle says “those who wish well for their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally” (Book VIII, Ch. 3), and “as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also” (Book IX, Ch. 9). In other words, if I am virtuous and a good friend, what is good for my friend is what I want by nature, and is therefore in my self-interest. In light of this, my act of sacrificing my life for my friend no longer seems entirely contrary to my self-interest.
Another reason sacrifice is in my self-interest is that acting virtuously is pleasant to the virtuous person, as mentioned earlier. This applies even to the extreme case of sacrificing my life for a friend; indeed, as Aristotle says in the very same sentence as he mentions dying for a friend (Book IX, Ch. 8), the good man “would prefer a short period of intense pleasure [brought about by his extremely virtuous act of self-sacrifice] to a long one of mild enjoyment.” In other words, if I am a virtuous person, then my one act of sacrificing my life for my friend will be the happiest moment of my life, and is thus in my own interest. Furthermore, if I shy away from the moral obligation of self-sacrifice, then I will have to live the rest of my life knowing that I did so. That would be a fate worse than death, and would permanently cripple my ability to find happiness in life; and going through with the sacrifice would be the only way to avoid that.
The final, and most profound, rebuttal to the apparent conflict between sacrifice and self-interest lies in the relation to society of my willingness to sacrifice for my friends or country. That is, the more people there are in society who are virtuous, to the point of being willing to sacrifice anything – even their lives – for their friends, the better off society as a whole is. In his discussion of political friendship or unanimity (Book IX, Ch. 6), Aristotle says bad men “aim at getting more than their share of advantages, while in labor and public service they fall short of their share”; and clearly, the fewer of such men there are in society, the better. Conversely, then, what society needs is more people who are willing to be virtuous, even if it leads to them receiving less than they give. Furthermore, what is good for society is also good for me, because a better society would be more just, and would provide me with greater benefits. Therefore, my willingness to sacrifice myself for a friend if necessary is in society's interest, and by extension my own interest.
The argument that, because sacrifice is necessary for virtue, virtue is opposed to happiness and self-interest, certainly does at first glance seem to damage Aristotle's views. However, the closer inspection I have given to the issue has convinced me that his views clearly win over these objections. In my view, Aristotle's notions of virtue and happiness are not at all in conflict. That is, being virtuous is in my own self-interest.
The central argument of Nicomachean Ethics is that the greatest good is happiness, and that each person should therefore pursue happiness as the central goal of their life. Aristotle comes to this conclusion, as well as a broad outline of what happiness is, in the introductory book (Book I). He claims that the greatest good must be the final end toward which everything else strives, and that it must be “always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else” and must on its own “make life desirable and lacking in nothing” (Book I, Ch. 7). Happiness, Aristotle says, meets these requirements, because “we choose [it] always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honor, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves . . . [are chosen] also for the sake of happiness.” Happiness is thus the greatest good, the pinnacle of excellence toward which we should all direct our lives and actions.
Aristotle's notion of happiness is, however, considerably different from the modern definition. Indeed, eudaimonia, the Greek word which Aristotle uses that has been translated as 'happiness', seems really to carry a connotation which the word 'happiness' does not. That is, eudaimonia is not a feeling, but a state of being; something which does not change from moment to moment, but rather can be used to describe a person's entire life. Eudaimonia, according to Aristotle, is a broad concept, which encompasses all of the lesser good pursuits of life – including pleasure, honor, friendship, even material wealth – but above all else, virtue.
This idea of virtue being the most vital component of happiness stems from what is known as Aristotle's function argument (Book I, Ch. 7). Aristotle claims that what makes something good can be found by asking what that something is good for; that is, what its function is. For example, the function of an eye is to see, so a good eye is one which sees well, and what is good for an eye is that which helps it to see well, such as glasses. The function of man, Aristotle says, is that capacity which man does not share with anything else. It cannot, therefore, be life, for this “seems to be common even to plants”; or sensory perception, for this “seems to be common even to . . . every animal.” This leaves us, according to Aristotle, with reason, as that which is unique to man. Thus, the function of man is reason; and a good man is one who lives a life full of activities that are in accordance with reason, which Aristotle equates with virtue; so a virtuous man is a good man. Furthermore, being a good person is a central component to leading a good, or happy, life, by Aristotle's definition.
Throughout Book II, Aristotle goes on to describe in detail what virtue is. He starts (Book II, Ch. 1) by splitting virtue into two classes, intellectual virtue and moral virtue. He says that while intellectual virtue can be taught, moral virtue – the more important type in regard to happiness, as it is the type which is concerned with actions and day-to-day life – “comes about as a result of habit.” That is, living virtuously makes one a virtuous person, which then leads to more virtuous actions.
Aristotle moves on to show the difference between virtue and the arts, through which he draws a vital conclusion about virtue (Book II, Ch. 4). He says “the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves”; that is, art can be judged as good or bad simply by looking at it. On the contrary, according to Aristotle, virtue depends not only on the action, but also on the mental state of the one performing the action. “The agent . . . must have knowledge”; that is, he must know that he is doing something virtuous; “he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes”; that is, he must choose to do it because it is virtuous; and “his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character”; that is, it is not true virtue if he happens to do something good, but rather doing good things must be part of his character. Aristotle also makes the claim that a virtuous person takes pleasure in doing virtuous things (Book II, Ch. 3).
The most important component of Aristotle's definition of virtue, though, is known as the doctrine of the mean (Book II, Ch. 6-9). The basic concept here is that “virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate” (Book II, Ch. 6); that is, for all passions and actions – such as fear, pleasure, anger, and honor – there can be too much, too little, or just the right amount. For example, it is possible to have too much fear – that is, to be cowardly; but it is also possible to have too little fear – that is, to be reckless. The middle ground here is a healthy, intermediate degree of courage, such that one does not run away from fearsome things, but also does not pursue them. Aristotle goes on to say (Book II, Ch. 8-9) that, while both the excess and the deficiency are inferior to the mean, in most cases one of them is closer to it. For instance, Aristotle says that recklessness is closer to courage than cowardice is.
Ultimately, much of the question of what is virtuous or not virtuous in any given situation is left to the reader to decide; after all, it would be impossible for Aristotle to look at every possible set of circumstances and actions and decide what the virtuous course of action is. Thus, Aristotle leaves us with these basic principles, and tells us to pursue happiness as our primary self-interest, and to do so primarily through performing virtuous acts.
The most profound and reasonable objection that can be raised against the position that it is in my own self-interest to be virtuous , by Aristotle's definition, is that it requires a lot of self-sacrifice. For instance, in his discussion of self-love (Book IX, Ch. 8), Aristotle claims that a good man “does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them.” For me to sacrifice my life for the sake of someone else would be the ultimate sacrifice; and this seems at odds with my own self-interest, as well as self-love, which Aristotle is promoting when he makes this claim. If I were to do such a thing, I would certainly be seen as noble by most people; but what good does that do me if I'm dead? A selfish person would most likely not be willing to give their life for someone else, precisely because they would see such an act as being in conflict with their self-interest. This conflict, furthermore, is not limited to the sacrifice of life. Indeed, Aristotle goes on to say that a good man will also sacrifice wealth, honor and office to his friends; but someone acting with their own self-interest in mind would not likely do these things, either. This seems, at first glance, to be a fatal flaw in Aristotle's reasoning.
Upon closer examination, however, there are several clear and powerful responses to this objection which, taken together, thoroughly refute it. The first comes from Aristotle's concept of true friendship, as discussed throughout Books VIII and IX. This is relevant because, when Aristotle said sacrifice is often a necessary component of virtue, he was talking about sacrificing for the sake of a friend (or one's country, and by extension all of one's friends). In a true friendship, according to Aristotle, both parties want what is good for each other. Indeed, Aristotle says “those who wish well for their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally” (Book VIII, Ch. 3), and “as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also” (Book IX, Ch. 9). In other words, if I am virtuous and a good friend, what is good for my friend is what I want by nature, and is therefore in my self-interest. In light of this, my act of sacrificing my life for my friend no longer seems entirely contrary to my self-interest.
Another reason sacrifice is in my self-interest is that acting virtuously is pleasant to the virtuous person, as mentioned earlier. This applies even to the extreme case of sacrificing my life for a friend; indeed, as Aristotle says in the very same sentence as he mentions dying for a friend (Book IX, Ch. 8), the good man “would prefer a short period of intense pleasure [brought about by his extremely virtuous act of self-sacrifice] to a long one of mild enjoyment.” In other words, if I am a virtuous person, then my one act of sacrificing my life for my friend will be the happiest moment of my life, and is thus in my own interest. Furthermore, if I shy away from the moral obligation of self-sacrifice, then I will have to live the rest of my life knowing that I did so. That would be a fate worse than death, and would permanently cripple my ability to find happiness in life; and going through with the sacrifice would be the only way to avoid that.
The final, and most profound, rebuttal to the apparent conflict between sacrifice and self-interest lies in the relation to society of my willingness to sacrifice for my friends or country. That is, the more people there are in society who are virtuous, to the point of being willing to sacrifice anything – even their lives – for their friends, the better off society as a whole is. In his discussion of political friendship or unanimity (Book IX, Ch. 6), Aristotle says bad men “aim at getting more than their share of advantages, while in labor and public service they fall short of their share”; and clearly, the fewer of such men there are in society, the better. Conversely, then, what society needs is more people who are willing to be virtuous, even if it leads to them receiving less than they give. Furthermore, what is good for society is also good for me, because a better society would be more just, and would provide me with greater benefits. Therefore, my willingness to sacrifice myself for a friend if necessary is in society's interest, and by extension my own interest.
The argument that, because sacrifice is necessary for virtue, virtue is opposed to happiness and self-interest, certainly does at first glance seem to damage Aristotle's views. However, the closer inspection I have given to the issue has convinced me that his views clearly win over these objections. In my view, Aristotle's notions of virtue and happiness are not at all in conflict. That is, being virtuous is in my own self-interest.
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